





































ME, MY W ILL, AND  I .  
KANT ’S  REPUBLICAN  CONCEPTION  
OF FREEDOM OF THE W ILL 





Abstract · Kant’s theory of  freedom, in particular his claim that natural determinism is com-
patible with absolute freedom, is widely regarded as puzzling and incoherent. In this paper I 
argue that what Kant means by ‘freedom’ has been widely misunderstood. Kant uses the de-
nition of  freedom found in the republican tradition of  political theory, according to which 
freedom is opposed to dependence, slavery, and related notions – not to determinism or to co-
ercion. Discussing Kant’s accounts of  freedom of  the will and freedom of  the agent in turn, I 
argue that this insight sheds new light on Kant’s transcendental compatibilism and suggests 
novel responses to age-old objections. 
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mmanuel Kant’s position in the free will debate is widely viewed as mysterious, 
inconsistent, or both. Kant famously defends the thesis of  thoroughgoing natural 
determinism and even goes so far as to claim that we can in principle «calculate» a 
human being’s future conduct «with certainty, as in the case of  a lunar or solar eclipse» 
(KpV, AA v 99). He also assumes, however, that «every intentional action» has a «free 
causality as its ground» (KpV, AA v 100). And he rejects the dominant strategy for rec-
onciling freedom and determinism, which is to dene freedom in opposition to ex-
ternal coercion and obstruction, rather than in opposition to natural determinism. 
Kant insists that freedom should be conceived as «absolute spontaneity», that is, as the 
power to act independently of  natural causes, and that this cannot be located within 
nature (KpV, AA v 96-100). 
This combination of  claims loos puzzling, and Kant’s move of  locating freedom 
in an unnowable ‘noumenal’ realm is usually not seen as very helpful, to put it 
mildly. Even sympathetic interpreters nd it impossible fully to reconcile Kant’s com-
mitment to natural determinism with his defense of  absolute freedom.d This verdict 
is re_ected in the fact that Kant’s position on the matter is not seen as a live philo-
sophical option in the current free will debate.2 
* pauline.leingeld@rug.nl, University of  Groningen. 
d For details and references, see section 2. 3 below. 
2 This is illustrated by the fact that surveys of  the free will debate either treat Kant’s position as a ‘mysteri-
ous’ view of  merely historical interest (R. Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, Oxford, Oxford 
 University Press, 2005, pp. 42-44) or do not discuss the view in any detail at all (e.g., M. Griffith, Free Will: The 
https://doi.org/10.19272/202002901008 · «studi kantiani», xxxiii, 2020
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In this essay, I argue that the diZculties surrounding Kant’s theory of  freedom stem 
largely from the fact that his notion of  freedom has been misunderstood. Given that he 
refuses to dene freedom in opposition to coercion and obstruction, it is widely taen 
for granted that he denes it in opposition to natural determinism. It has gone unno-
ticed that Kant instead employs a third, republican notion of  freedom, according to 
which freedom is dened in opposition to slavery, dependence and domination. Since 
Kant means something diterent by ‘freedom’ than most readers assume,d it is not sur-
prising that his theory has struc many as strange and incoherent. To illustrate the ad-
vantages of  a republican reading of  Kant’s notion of  freedom, I will show how it 
solves some of  the most notorious problems diagnosed in the literature. 
I will also argue for a second interpretive thesis, namely that we should distinguish 
between freedom of  the will and freedom of  the agent. The two are often con_ated, 
which obscures Kant’s analysis of  the relation between natural determinism and 
noumenal freedom. 
I rst present the common understanding of  Kant’s notion of  freedom, setch his 
transcendental idealist defense of  freedom, and outline the main diZculties associ-
ated with it in the literature (section 2). I then turn to the republican notion of  free-
dom and show that Kant uses it in his political theory (section 3). In section 4, I argue 
that Kant employs the very same notion of  freedom in his discussion of  freedom of  
the will, and I illustrate how, on a republican reading, several canonical objections 
evaporate (section 4). In section 5, I turn to the absolute freedom of  the agent. I argue 
that a republican reading sheds new light on Kant’s conception of  absolute freedom 
and its compatibility with natural determinism (section 5). 
 
2. Kant’s Position on Freedom and Determinism, 
and the Problems it is Thought to Face 
 
2. 1. Kant’s Critique of  the ‘Comparative’ Notion of  Freedom 
 
As is familiar, Kant argues both that without freedom there is no genuine moral 
 obligation or moral responsibility and that freedom cannot exist within the realm of  
natural determinism.2 Formulating the ‘Consequence Argument’ avant la lettre, he 
 explains that in a deterministic world my actions are never within my control, and I 
am therefore never free: 
 
For, [natural determinism] implies that every event, and consequently every action that occurs 
at a certain point in time, is necessary under the condition of  what preceded it. Now, since the 
past is no longer within my control, every action that I perform must be necessary because of  
Basics, New Yor, Routledge, 2013; M. McKenna, D. Pereboom, Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction, New 
Yor, Routledge, 2016; T. O’Connor, C. E. Franklin, Free Will, «Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy» 
[Spring 2020 Edition], ed. by E. N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/freewill/). 
d There is at least one exception. After I presented this paper at a conference, I learned that Sven Nyholm 
has also brie_y suggested that Kant’s notion of  freedom is republican (S. Nyholm, Revisiting Kant’s Universal 
Law and Humanity Formulas, Berlin-Boston, de Gruyter, 2015, pp. 9n., 25, 115). 
2 In one footnote, Kant calls ‘predeterminism’ preferable to ‘determinism’ (RGV, AA vi 49-50n.), since, on 
his view, a free will also needs to be ‘determined’, namely determined by reason. I generally use ‘natural de-
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determining grounds that are not within my control, that is, at the point in time at which I act I 
am never free. 
(KpV, AA v 94) 
 
Kant acnowledges that this conclusion is challenged by those who contest the very 
notion of  freedom it presupposes. On what he calls their «comparative» (non-abso-
lute) conception of  freedom (KpV, AA v 96), freedom is compatible with natural de-
terminism. These compatibilists distinguish between free and unfree doings within 
the realm of  natural determinism. Free actions, on their conception, are those deter-
ministically caused actions that result from natural causes internal to the agent. The 
contrast class is formed by cases in which the agent is moved or obstructed by external 
causes (though perhaps mediated by internal processes), such as cases of  coercion, 
manipulation, and impediments of  various sorts. 
Kant argues that this comparative notion of  freedom is entirely insuZcient for 
moral responsibility and that it is not the «proper sense» of  the term (KpV, AA v 97). 
He famously denounces it as «the freedom of  a turnspit» (KpV, AA v 96-97). Surely 
there is a possible (comparative, non-absolute) sense of  ‘freedom’ in accordance with 
which we can say that a turnspit turns around freely, namely when nothing else 
hinders its movement and, «once it is wound up, it carries out its movements of  itself» 
due to its own inner mechanism (KpV, AA v 97). But we do not hold a turnspit morally 
responsible for turning on account of  its turning ‘freely’ in this sense. In the same 
sense, we can say that a human being acts freely when it is moved to act by its own 
inner psychological mechanism (KpV, AA v 96). But just as we do not hold the turnspit 
morally responsible for turning, we should not hold a human agent morally respon-
sible on account of  his acting ‘freely’ in this sense. If  human actions are the result of  
natural determinism, whatever the human being does or does not do is necessary 
given the laws of  nature and causal antecedents. Then actions are not within the agent’s 
control, and the agent is not morally responsible (KpV, AA v 97). 
Kant’s rejection of  the ‘comparative’ understanding of  freedom is also clear from 
a number of  passages that must sound lie utter provocations to the ears of  tradi-
tional compatibilists. In discussing the famous ‘gallows example’ in the Critique of  
Practical Reason, for instance, Kant asserts that if  a ruler threatens to hang a man un-
less he provides false testimony against an innocent person, it is then that the man be-
comes aware of  his freedom (KpV, AA v 30) – even though this is a clear case of  exter-
nal coercion. 
Given Kant’s criticism of  the compatibilist ‘comparative’ notion of  freedom and his 
defense of  ‘absolute’ freedom, and on the assumption that there are only two options, 
the vast majority of  interpreters assume that what he means by ‘freedom’ is, or in any 
case involves, the ability to choose among alternative possibilities in the empirical 
world.d 
d A small number of  authors have proposed a compatibilist reading of  Kant along Davidsonian lines (e.g., 
R. Meerbote, Kant on the Nondeterminate Character of  Human Actions, in Kant on Causality, Freedom, and Objec-
tivity, ed. by W. A. Harper, R. Meerbote, Minneapolis, University of  Minnesota Press, 1984, pp. 138-163; H. Hud-
son, Kant’s Compatibilism, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1994), following Davidson’s own suggestions in his 
essay Mental Events (D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980, pp. 207-227). The 
main problem for this reading is that it does not allow noumenal agency to have an etect in the phenomenal 
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2. 2. Kant’s Theory of  Freedom 
 
If  absolute freedom is understood to involve genuine alternative possibilities in the 
phenomenal world, however, it becomes hard to see how Kant can reconcile his de-
fense of  it with his commitment to natural determinism. Yet he claims that his tran-
scendental idealism accomplishes just this. The goal of  this section is to setch a foil 
against which the diagnosed diZculties, outlined in 2. 3, can be understood. Such a 
setch is a rather precarious undertaing, however, given the large number of  inter-
pretive debates and the deep divisions in Kant scholarship concerning the proper 
understanding of  Kant’s transcendental idealism. I here present one possible line of  
interpretation, but the diZculties diagnosed in 2. 3 are not uniquely associated with 
the particular account I present here.d 
Kant’s general transcendental idealist approach in the Critique of  Pure Reason is 
guided by the thought that the mode of  operation of  our cognitive powers deter-
mines certain necessary features (‘formal conditions’) of  the world as it appears to 
us.2 To use an anachronistic analogy:V a functioning blac-and-white TV will trans-
form any signal it receives into a two-dimensional display in blac, white, and/or grey. 
If  we now this, we also understand that whatever appears on the screen will necess-
arily be two-dimensional and on the white-grey-blac spectrum. Analogously, if  we 
now how our cognitive powers operate, we have a priori nowledge of  the necessary 
features of  the world as it appears to us (the world as we cognize it). 
Kant argues that this guiding thought immediately forces the distinction between 
«things as they appear to us» (phenomena) and their underlying ground, «things as 
they are in themselves» (noumena). Kant calls the latter «noumena» because they can 
only be thought. Per denition, the ground of  appearances is cognitively inaccessible 
to us, since it is precisely the thing as it is independently of  our mode of  cognition. 
We arrive at the thought of  this «unnown something» by abstracting from the way 
we cognize (KrV, A 235-260 B 294-315).R 
One of  Kant’s core claims is that his approach provides the philosophical underpin-
ning of  the foundational, metaphysical principles of  (Newtonian) natural science. 
Consider the principle that every event has a cause which determines it necessarily, in 
accordance with natural laws (e.g., KrV, A 201 B 246-247). If  this principle derives from 
our mode of  cognition, then it is true a priori, of  the world as we now it, that every 
event has a cause which determines it necessarily in accordance with natural laws. Put 
diterently, in that case natural determinism is a necessary feature of  the world as it 
d For an overview of  diterent interpretive positions, with special attention to their relevance to Kant’s the-
ory of  freedom, see E. Watkins, Kant and the Metaphysics of  Causality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2005, ch. 5. For a discussion of  the methodology of  transcendental argument, see G. Gava, Kant, the Third Anti-
nomy and Transcendental Arguments, «Pacic Philosophical Quarterly», c, 2, 2019, pp. 453-481. 
2 See the very beginning of  the «Introduction» to the Critique of  Pure Reason (B version). 
V It is important, here and below when I return to this analogy, only to focus on the point for which the anal-
ogy is used. There are many respects in which the cases are not analogous. To mention an obvious disanalogy: 
in the TV case, the ‘ground’ of  the image on my screen can be identied and described (actors in a studio, com-
puter-generated imagery, etc.). 
R For Kant’s statements that phenomena, as such, must have «grounds» in noumena, see KrV, A 537 B 565, A 
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appears to us. And in the Critique of  Pure Reason, Kant provides a lengthy argument in 
support of  the claim that this is indeed the case. This motivates his claim that we can 
in principle ‘calculate’ the future behavior of  human agents. 
Kant also points out, however, that his approach maes it not contradictory to com-
bine the claim that the natural world is thoroughly deterministic with the idea that 
human beings have absolute freedom. As he argues in his discussion of  the «Third 
Antinomy», knowledge of  noumena is per denition impossible, but it is not imposs-
ible to conceive or think of  noumena in a certain way. He claims that this maes room 
for the idea of  absolute freedom (KrV, A 538-541 B 566-569). To return to the earlier 
analogy: if  I now that whatever image appears on my TV screen must be blac, 
white or grey, due to my TV’s mode of  operation, this does not mae it contradictory 
for me to conceive of  the ground of  an image on my screen (say, a _ower) as having 
color, even if, given merely my TV set and my nowledge of  its operation, this 
ground remains entirely inaccessible to me. 
Kant subsequently taes the further step of  arguing, still in his discussion of  the 
«Third Antinomy», that we may legitimately assume that we have absolute freedom. 
We happen to have a strong ground for assuming that we do, namely our conscious-
ness of  moral obligation.d Here we believe ourselves to be unconditionally obligated 
to act in accordance with moral laws even if  doing so runs counter to all of  our sen-
sible desires. On the basis of  our consciousness of  moral obligation we judge that we 
can act in accordance with moral laws, which means that we assume that we can act 
independently of  our sensible desires, that is, freely. Given that his transcendental ide-
alism has room for this assumption, Kant argues, we may indeed believe we have ab-
solute freedom.2 
This belief  clearly includes the idea that we can act on the basis of  something other 
than sensible desires, and this, Kant writes, «we call reason» (KrV, A 547 B 575). He 
writes: 
 
Now that this reason has causality, or that we at least represent to ourselves something of  the 
sort in it, is clear from the imperatives that we give our executive powers as rules in everything 
practical. The ought expresses a type of  necessity and a connection with grounds that does not 
occur anywhere in the whole of  nature.V 
(KrV, A 547 B 575) 
d Although I cannot discuss this here, I believe that Kant defends a similar view in the Groundwork and the 
Critique of  Practical Reason and that there is more continuity in his argument than is sometimes thought. See 
P. Kleingeld, Moral Consciousness and the Fact of  Reason, in A Critical Guide to Kant’s Critique of  Practical 
 Reason, ed. by J. Timmermann, A. Reath, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 55-72 for Kant’s 
argument in the Critique of  Practical Reason; see S. Tenenbaum, The Idea of  Freedom and Moral Cognition in 
Groundwork III, «Philosophy and Phenomenological Research», lxxxiv, 3, 2012, pp. 555-589 and O. Ware, Kant’s 
Deductions of  Morality and Freedom, «Canadian Journal of  Philosophy», xlvii, 1, 2017, pp. 116-147 for the continu-
ities in Kant’s position. 
2 On the epistemic status of  this ‘assumption’, which is subjectively certain (although it lacs objective jus-
tication) and hence qualies as belief  (holding-to-be-true) but not as theoretical nowledge, see KrV, B xxviii-
xxx; A 820-831 B 848-859, KpV, AA v 142-146, WDO, AA viii 137, MS, AA vi 354; P. Kleingeld, The Conative Char-
acter of  Reason in Kant’s Philosophy, «Journal of  the History of  Philosophy», xxxvi, 1, 1998, pp. 77-97; M. 
Willaschek, Freedom As a Postulate, in Kant on Persons and Agency, ed. by E. Watins, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2018, pp. 102-119. 
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Furthermore, Kant writes that we sometimes regard actual human actions as having 
been performed on the basis of  «grounds of  reason»: 
 
At times … we nd, or at least believe we nd, that the ideas of  reason have actually proved 
their causality in regard to the actions of  human beings as appearances, and that these actions 
have occurred not because they were determined by empirical causes, no, but because they 
were determined by grounds of  reason. 
(KrV, A 550 B 578) 
 
Kant here claims – stressing in the rst clause of  both quoted passages that this is not 
a matter of  theoretical nowledge – that, in moral contexts, we regard reason as a 
cause of  actions. 
Kant claims that his transcendental idealism can accommodate this thought by re-
lating moral obligation and imputation to the noumenal ground of  the actions, namely 
to the agent as a thing in itself. He emphasizes the diterence between the causal 
 explanation and the moral imputation of  a phenomenal action. When we give a causal 
explanation, we explain the phenomenal action in terms of  the natural laws and 
antecedent conditions that caused it to happen. When we impute an action to an 
agent and evaluate it morally, by contrast, we judge the noumenal agent in light of  
moral laws and assume that he can act independently of  natural causes. 
As an example, Kant mentions the case of  a malicious lie. He asserts that we can 
explain the agent’s lie in terms of  natural laws and empirical causal antecedents, such as 
his natural psychological tendencies, upbringing, bad company, and so on (KrV, A 554-
555 B 582-583). When we nevertheless hold him morally responsible for the lie and 
blame him, we do something entirely diterent: we judge the agent in light of  moral laws 
and presuppose that he «could have and ought to have» behaved diterently: 
 
This blame is based on a law of  reason, whereby one regards reason as a cause that, regardless 
of  all the empirical conditions just mentioned, could have and ought to have determined the con-
duct of  the human being dierently. 
(KrV, A 555 B 583, emphasis added; cf. KpV, AA v 95-96) 
 
We judge that his lie «stood directly under the power of  reason» and was «determined 
independently of  sensibility» (KrV, A 556-557 B 584-585). 
 
2. 3. Common Diagnoses of  Important Diculties 
 
To many readers, Kant’s position as setched above seems strained, if  not downright 
incoherent. In the liar example, Kant seems to assume the existence of  alternative em-
pirical possibilities – to lie or not to lie. Hence Kant is taen to assume that we are 
«free to act in ways other than we are causally determined to act», that is, to employ 
a «contra-causal» notion of  freedom.d But this seems incompatible with the natural 
determinism he defends. 
Most interpreters hold that freedom, according to Kant, consists in an ability to 
choose. The relevant choice can be conceived as the choice between moral and im-





































                 freedom, will and agent: kants’ republican conception            109
moral actions,d moral and immoral maxims, or as the choice of  one’s most fundamental 
maxim – either the maxim of  duty or the maxim of  self-love – which guides one’s 
adoption of  lower-level maxims.2 Other interpreters defend the view that the relevant 
ability should be conceived as asymmetrical. On their view, freedom, as independence 
from sensibility, consists not in the ability to choose between moral and immoral op-
tions, but in the capacity to choose to do what morality demands. This thus restricts 
the range of  options to morally right actions or maxims.V 
Despite these diterences concerning interpretive details, there is wide agreement 
in the literature that Kant’s reconciliation of  freedom with natural determinism is un-
successful. If  the thesis of  determinism is true, then all my future behavior is already 
predetermined. This maes it hard to see how I could ever avoid future moral failures, 
and if  I cannot, then it will not only be untrue to say, later, that I ‘could have and ought 
to have’ behaved diterently but also unjust to blame me for doing what I did. Con-
versely, if  two or more alternative empirical actions are within my control (say, to lie 
or not to lie), then it is hard to see how this can be squared with Kant’s commitment 
to natural determinism and the predictability of  my actions. Furthermore, given natu-
ral determinism, it seems that the ability to act otherwise would require, rather im-
plausibly, an ability to change the laws of  nature and/or the course of  history. After 
all, diterent phenomenal options would require diterent causal antecedents, since 
otherwise the chosen action would lac a suZcient causal explanation.R 
Equally puzzling, in the eyes of  many, is the fact that Kant explicitly denies that free-
dom consists in the capacity to choose whether or not to act morally (MS, vi 226). It 
would seem that when Kant blames a liar for lying, he must be assuming that his free-
dom consists precisely in his capacity to choose whether or not to lie. So it seems 
unclear why he would deny this. 
Within Kant scholarship, some have addressed these problems by arguing that 
Kant’s commitment to determinism is weaer than it seems. For example, it has been 
argued that Kant’s discussion of  the «Second Analogy» in the Critique of  Pure Reason 
does not rule out that some phenomena (viz., human actions) have free causes.L 
Others have argued that Kant considers the principle of  natural causal determinism 
to be merely regulative,G or that his defense of  determinism leaves open alternative 
d E.g., M. Kohl, Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative, «Ethics», cxxv, 2, 2015, pp. 331-356; B. Vil-
hauer, Immanuel Kant, in The Routledge Companion to Free Will, ed. by K. Timpe, M. GriZth, N. Levy, New Yor, 
Routledge, 2017, pp. 343-355. 
2 R. Bader, Kant on Freedom and Practical Irrationality, in The Idea of  Freedom: New Essays on the Interpretation 
and Signi+cance of  Kant’s Theory of  Freedom, ed. by D. Heide, E. Titany, Oxford, Oxford University Press, forth-
coming. 
V A. W. Wood, Kant’s Compatibilism, in Self  and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy, ed. by A. W. Wood, Ithaca, Cor-
nell University Press, 1984, pp. 73-101 (77-82); J. Timmermann, Kant’s Groundwork of  the Metaphysics of  Morals: A 
Commentary, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 164-167. 
R Cf. J. Timmermann, Sittengesetz und Freiheit: Untersuchungen zu Immanuel Kants Theorie des freien Willens, 
Berlin, de Gruyter, 2003, p. 113; Wood, Kant’s Compatibilism, p. 92; Watkins, Kant and the Metaphysics of  Causal-
ity, ch. 5; Vilhauer, Immanuel Kant. 
L M. Wolff, Kant über Freiheit und Determinismus, in Kants Metaphysi der Sitten in der Diskussion, ed. by 
B.2Tuschling, W. Euler, Berlin, Duncer & Humblot, 2013, pp. 27-42 (27-30). 
G J. Bojanowski, Ist Kant ein Kompatibilist?, in Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwor-
tung im transzendentalen Idealismus, ed. by M. Brandhorst, A. Hahmann, B. Ludwig, Hamburg, Meiner, 2012, 
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possibilities for the future.d On these lines of  interpretation, however, it is impossible 
fully to integrate Kant’s repeated statements that it is in principle possible to calculate 
future human behavior (KpV, AA v 99, and similar claims elsewhere, e.g., KrV, A 539 B 
567, A 549-550 B 577-578). 
A further notorious diZculty is the fact that Kant identies «a free will» with «a will 
under moral laws» (GMS, iv 446-447). This passage is often read as meaning that only 
a morally good will is a free will, or that a free will is restricted to choosing what is 
good, and then the statement leads to an obvious objection. It seems to entail that 
agents who act impermissibly do not have a free will. But if  they do not, they cannot 
be morally responsible for their bad actions. This classic objection is nown as the 
Reinhold–Sidgwic objection (although, ironically, Reinhold in fact presents it as an 
objection made by others and aims to defend Kant against it).2 In response, Henry Al-
lison and Jochen Bojanowsi, among others, have pointed out that Kant is not philo-
sophically committed to the problematic position attributed to him, and that he 
speas of  a will under moral laws rather than a good will.V Nevertheless, the wording 
of  the passage at issue remains cryptic. 
Given that these diZculties constitute serious problems, it is not surprising that 
leading commentators view Kant’s theory of  freedom as a «mystery»R or as «utterly 
unacceptable»,L with some concluding that «[u]ltimately, even the most charitable in-
terpretation of  Kant’s attempt to reconcile the closed causal system of  natural deter-
minism and free will is bound to fail».G Nor is it surprising that Kant’s theory of  free-
dom does not have any champions in the current free will debate.< 
 
3. Kant’s Republican Notion of Freedom  
What has gone unnoticed in the literature is that Kant in fact employs a republican no-
tion of  freedom. Rather than opposing freedom to natural determinism or to external 
coercion, he opposes it to dependence, slavery, domination, despotism and related no-
tions. Positively speaing, and in line with core ideas of  the republican tradition in 
political theory, he sees freedom as independence, being one’s own master, having control, 
and having autonomy. This reading of  Kant’s notion of  freedom sheds new light on his 
conception of  freedom of  the will and freedom of  agents, as I argue in subsequent 
d L. Allais, Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 303-
308. 
2 K. L. Reinhold, Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie, ed. by M. Bondeli, Basel, Schwabe, 2008 [1792], pp. 
185-187 [267-269]; see also P. Guyer, The Struggle for Freedom: Freedom of  Will in Kant and Reinhold, in Kant on 
 Persons and Agency, ed. by E. Watins, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 120-137. 
V Allison, Kant’s Theory of  Freedom, pp. 39-40, 94-99, 133-136; J. Bojanowski, Kants Theorie der Freiheit: 
 Rekonstruktion und Rehabilitierung, Berlin, de Gruyter, 2006, chs. 7-8. 
R Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, p. 44. 
L A. W. Wood, Kantian Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 141. 
G Timmermann, Kant’s Groundwork, p. 166. 
< Christine Korsgaard’s ctionalist account is an exception. She reads Kant as saying that the nowledge that 
one’s choices are determined must be «simply ignored» in acting and that «the point is not that you must believe 
that you are free, but that you must choose as if  you were free». She adds that «you will believe that your deci-
sion is a sham, but it maes no diterence» (C. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of  Ends, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1996, pp. 162-163). It is hard to nd this view in Kant’s texts, though, not to mention the 
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sections. Here, I rst explicate the republican notion of  freedom and show that Kant 
uses it in his political philosophy. 
The republican conception of  freedom as non-domination or independence is well 
nown by now in discussions of  political freedom. Over the past few decades, Quen-
tin Sinnerd and Philip Pettit,2 among others, have re-introduced this conception into 
debates in political philosophy. On the republican view, political freedom consists not 
in having options, and not in non-interference, but in non-domination – more speci-
cally, in not being under the power of  the arbitrary choice of  another. 
Slavery is the paradigmatic example of  unfreedom. An enslaved person is subject 
to the jurisdiction of  a ‘master’. The master has unilateral power over the slave and 
can decide to use the latter at his discretion. The slave is unfree regardless of  whether 
the master actively coerces him; having a so-called ‘benevolent master’V does not turn 
the slave into a free person. Thus, unfreedom does not so much consist in not being 
coerced as in having no protection against coercion. Unfreedom consists in not being 
independent of  arbitrary coercion. In the republican tradition, this way of  conceiving 
of  unfreedom is extended to other forms of  subordination. The subjects in a despotic 
state, who are subordinated to the arbitrary will of  a despot, are unfree. Those living 
under the dominion of  a colonial power are unfree. Oppressed groups may ght for 
‘liberation’ and ‘emancipation’ – again in terminology associated with the master-
slave relation. 
Those within the republican tradition of  political philosophy typically hold that 
freedom and equality are two sides of  the same coin, meaning that the genuine free-
dom of  citizens can be secured only within a community of  equals. This is the repub-
lic. The republican tradition includes diterent views, however, as to the political insti-
tutions required to ensure freedom. Among early modern republican theorists, some, 
such as the Federalists, argued that freedom requires a system of  checs and balances, 
to be instituted by public law. Others, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, emphasized that 
public laws must issue from collective legislation by the citizens themselves. All brands 
of  republicanism agree, however, that freedom is opposed to subjection to the arbi-
trary (discretionary) power of  another and that it requires the rule of  law. 
Note that the republican ideal of  freedom and equality among citizens can be com-
bined with the denial of  citizenship status, partly or fully, to the vast majority of  
people aZliated with a particular republic. Children, women, enslaved persons, col-
onized peoples, Jews, foreign residents, certain racialized groups, and economically 
dependent males are some of  the categories who were regularly excluded from full 
citizenship status in early modern republican theory and practice – with many indi-
viduals falling under several of  these categories simultaneously. 
Kant clearly belongs to the republican tradition of  political theory, and he regards 
both the separation of  powers and collective self-legislation as essential. In the Meta-
physics of  Morals he equates «freedom» with «independence from being compelled by 
d Q. Skinner, The Idea of  Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives, in Philosophy in History: Es-
says in the Historiography of  Philosophy, ed. by R. Rorty, Q. Sinner, J. B. Schneewind, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1984, pp. 193-221; Idem, Liberty before Liberalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
2 P. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of  Freedom and Government, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997. 
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another’s choice» (MS, AA vi 237). In the «Doctrine of  Right», he argues that the only 
way for each and every (‘active’) citizen to be free in this sense – that is, the only way 
for citizens to avoid being subject to the power of  another who rules over them at his 
personal discretion – is for all citizens to unite and collectively give public laws to 
which they are all equally subject. In order to enable the separation of  powers, legis-
lation should tae place via a representative system rather than a (direct) democracy. 
Citizens should have the right to vote for representatives and legislate through these 
delegates (MS, AA vi 314). Kant holds that this political system, which he calls «a pure 
republic», is «the only constitution that accords with right» (MS, AA vi 340). 
The freedom of  the citizens, thus conceived, consists in their living under their own 
laws. Their freedom consists neither in the absence of  laws nor in the ability to decide 
whether to obey the law, let alone in their being able to brea the law. They can brea 
the law, of  course, but this is not what their political freedom consists in. Their free-
dom consists in their autonomy, that is, in the fact that the laws which they ought to 
obey are their own laws rather than the heteronomous dictates of  a despot. 
Kant only started to defend active citizen voting rights in the 1790s, but his commit-
ment to republicanism and the associated notion of  freedom are found throughout 
his wor from the Critical period (and before). For example, it is evident in his Feyer -
abend Lectures on Natural Law (1784), which he held during the months in which he 
was2writing the Groundwork (e.g., V-NR/Feyerabend, AA xxvii 1383), and it is found in 
the political analogies that Kant uses in the Groundwork and the Critique of  Practical 
Reason, as will become clear below. During the 1780s, the idea of  the republic served 
as a counterfactual normative criterion to be used by an enlightened autocrat: the 
ruler should give laws to the people that the people «could» adopt themselves.d For 
the purposes of  this paper, it is not necessary to pursue the development of  Kant’s 
political theory. What matters here is merely that Kant’s conception of  political free-
dom clearly stands in the republican tradition. 
Note, however, that Kant restricts full (‘active’) citizenship status, even in the Meta-
physics of  Morals, to (economically, socially, civilly) independent adult males (MS, vi 
314-315). While he argues that men ought to have the opportunity to wor their way 
up to independence and active citizenship, Kant _atly denies this right to women, 
with reference to the «natural superiority» of  men (MS, vi 279, 314). This matches his 
description of  the distinct «characteristics» and separate «vocation» of  women in his 
Anthropology lectures (e.g., Anth, vii 303-311). In the early Observations on the Feeling of  
the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764), Kant wrote: «I hardly believe that the fair sex is ca-
pable of  principles», claiming that women have a separate ind of  virtue that involves 
«nothing of  ought, nothing of  must, nothing of  obligation» (GSE, AA ii 232). Kant 
does not seem to have ever completely renounced this assessment. In order to avoid 
representing his views as more egalitarian than they seem to have been, I will there-
fore follow his use of  male pronouns.2 
d WA, AA viii 39; see P. Kleingeld, Moral Autonomy as Political Analogy: Self-legislation in Kant’s Groundwor 
and the Feyerabend Lectures on Natural Law, in The Emergence of  Autonomy, ed. by S. Bacin, O. Sensen, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 158-175 (169-170). 
2 See P. Kleingeld, On Dealing with Kant’s Sexism and Racism, «SGIR Review», ii, 2, 2019, pp. 3-22 for further 
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4. Republican Freedom of the Will 
 
The new prominence of  the republican notion of  freedom in current political theory 
has not yet led to its reintroduction into the free will debate. In the early modern free 
will debate, however, the republican understanding of  freedom was quite common, 
and Kant is a case in point.d There are striing terminological similarities between his 
discussion of  political freedom, on the one hand, and his discussion of  freedom of  the 
will, on the other.2 
I discuss freedom of  the will and freedom of  the agent in turn, although these 
topics are of  course intimately related. Kant conceives of  the will as an agent’s capac-
ity to act on the basis of  reasoning. The issue of  freedom of  the will concerns the de-
termination of  the content of  an agent’s will, that is, its end or object. For Kant, the 
question here is whether reason alone can determine the object of  the will, indepen-
dently of  sensible desire. The issue of  freedom of  the agent concerns the causality of  the 
agent in determining his will. The question here is whether an agent can act indepen-
dently of  natural determinism. 
Attributions of  moral responsibility, according to Kant, presuppose both the free-
dom of  the will and the absolute freedom of  the agent in acting. I aim to show that 
in each case Kant uses a republican notion of  freedom. Kant also phrases the distinc-
tion in terms of  that between «practical freedom» and «transcendental freedom». He 
explicates practical freedom in terms of  freedom of  the will (KrV, A 534 B 562; A 800-
804 B 828-832; KpV, AA v 167), and he equates transcendental and absolute freedom 
(KpV, AA v 98). Because Kant’s discussion of  ‘practical freedom’ is associated with ex-
egetical debates concerning the relation between the «Dialectic» and the «Canon» of  
the rst Critique, which I do not have the space to address here, I bracet this term in 
this paper. I discuss transcendental or absolute freedom in section 5. 
 
4. 1. Freedom of  the Will 
 
Imputing an action to me presupposes that my will is not determined by my sensible 
desires in accordance with the «mechanism of  nature», Kant writes. For if  it were, 
«my will would not be my own but the will of  nature» (V-NR/Feyerabend, AA xxvii 
1322). I could not be morally responsible for willing what I will, since my will would 
be determined by sensible desires resulting from natural causal processes that extend 
innitely into the past before I even existed. And if  I am not responsible for the con-
tent of  my will, then I cannot be responsible for performing the corresponding ac-
tions. Thus, the moral imputation of  actions to an agent presupposes that the agent’s 
will is free. But what does Kant mean by freedom of  the will? 
d For an important contemporaneous example, see Rousseau’s statement that «moral freedom … alone 
maes man truly the master of  himself; for the impulsion of  mere appetite is slavery, and obedience to the 
law one has prescribed to oneself  is freedom» (J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, in The Social Contract and 
Other Later Political Writings, ed. by V. Gourevitch, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997 [1762], boo 
i, ch. 8.3). 
2 The republican context of  Kant’s notion of  freedom also illuminates other aspects of  his moral theory, 
such as his prohibition of  using persons ‘merely as a means’. Kant, lie many others in the republican tradition, 
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Kant describes freedom of  the will in terms of  the republican contrast between in-
dependence and dependence, freedom and slavery, being one’s own master and being 
subservient to another. He consistently conceives of  the ‘freedom’ of  the will, formu-
lated negatively, as its ‘independence’ from sensible impulses. In the Critique of  Pure 
Reason, for example, Kant denes it as the «independence of  the will from being com-
pelled by impulses of  sensibility» (KrV, A 534 B 562; also A 802 B 830). 
Note the remarable similarity between this description of  freedom of  the will and 
Kant’s description of  freedom in the «Doctrine of  Right», quoted above, as «indepen-
dence from being compelled by another’s choice». In both cases, he denes freedom 
as «independence» (Unabhängigkeit) from «being compelled» (Nötigung) by another (by 
another person, or by sensibility, respectively). 
Note also that Kant does not contrast freedom of  the will to coercion as such. His 
denition maes freedom of  the will compatible with citizens of  a republic being co-
erced by the laws they have given themselves (MS, AA vi 231) and with the «self-co-
ercion» of  the virtuous agent (MS, AA vi 231, 379, 394). Nor does Kant dene freedom 
of  the will in terms of  a denial of  natural determinism or sensible desires, but rather 
in terms of  the will’s independence from the latter – and saying that x is independent 
of  y does not imply the denial of  y. Nor, nally, does Kant contrast freedom to the ab-
sence of  choice. The relevant contrast is between freedom of  the will and the will’s 
being subordinated to sensible desire. 
The will, on Kant’s denition of  it, is the capacity to act on the basis of  reasoning. 
This explains why Kant sometimes equates the will and practical reason (e.g., GMS, AA 
iv 412) and at other times speas of  reason determining the will, namely when the ca-
pacity is exercised and what is willed is indeed determined by reason. In the Ground-
work, he denes the will as «the capacity to act on the basis of  the representation of  
laws, that is, of  principles» (GMS, AA iv 412, cf. 427). This denition includes reasoning 
from moral and prudential principles. To mention one of  Kant’s examples of  the 
latter: the prospect of  surgery feels extremely disagreeable, but on the basis of  prac-
tical reasoning someone may decide to undergo it nevertheless (KpV, AA v 61). In this 
example, the agent reasons from the principle of  promoting his long-term health. He 
uses practical reason in the service of  his desire for long-term health. 
The idea that the will is free should be understood in contrast to the idea that prac-
tical reason merely serves as a means for the satisfaction of  desires. Negatively formu-
lated, it is the idea that the will can be determined independently of  sensible desires 
and impulses. Positively formulated, it is the idea that practical reason has principles 
of  its own (viz., moral principles) that can determine the will. Of  course, the idea that 
the will can be determined by moral principles does not imply that it will be. The 
human will is atected by sensible incentives, and moral principles hence present 
themselves as imperatives that state how humans ought to act. As Kant puts it in the 
Critique of  Pure Reason: 
 
The [will] that can be determined independently of  sensible impulses, thus through motives 
that can be represented only by reason is called the free will [ freie Willkür]. 
(KrV, A 802 B 830) 
 
In the Groundwork, Kant uses the notion of  ‘autonomy’ as a property of  the will to 
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the will be other than autonomy, that is, the property of  the will to be a law to itself ?» 
(AA iv 447), and he claims that «freedom and the will’s own legislation are both au-
tonomy and hence reciprocal concepts» (GMS, AA iv 450). Kant also expresses this 
idea in the Critique of  Practical Reason, again in terms of  the republican notion of  free-
dom as independence: 
 
[the will’s] independence [from desired objects] is freedom in the negative sense; whereas [the 
will’s] own legislation is freedom in the positive sense, [i.e., the legislation] of  pure and, as such, 
practical reason. 
(KpV, AA v 33) 
 
The reason for believing that the will is indeed free in this sense, according to Kant, 
is our consciousness of  moral obligation, as mentioned in 2. 2 above. The belief  
that morality unconditionally requires certain ways of  acting, even if  they run 
counter to all of  the agent’s sensible desires, gives us grounds for believing (without 
nowing) that these moral imperatives stem from pure practical reason itself  – that 
is, for believing that the will «is a law to itself» rather than merely serving sensible 
desire. 
In light of  Kant’s identication of  the will with practical reason, his defense of  the 
freedom of  the will turns out to be the counterpoint to Hume’s assertion that «reason 
is and ought only to be the slave of  the passions».d Kant asserts that we are justied 
in assuming that practical reason is free rather than the slave of  inclinations.2 
Hence it is not surprising that we do indeed nd statements where Kant explicitly 
denies what Hume asserts. In the section «On Freedom» in the Lectures on Metaphysics 
Mrongovius (1782-1783), for example, Kant reportedly said: 
 
If  reason discerns what is really good, or species the ends, then it loos after its own interest 
and is the master/mistress.V If  it merely devises a good means for the sae of  the end that 
arises from inclination, then it merely loos after the interest of  inclination and is the slave. 
(V-MP/Mron, AA xxix 899) 
 
And a few pages later: 
 
If  in the use of  our will we have regard only for our empirical happiness, then … inclination 
reigns, determines the end, and reason is the slave who must provide the means. But morality 
says that … reason alone must be the master (Herr). 
(V-MP/Mron, AA xxix 901) 
 
Kant here describes the free will as a will that is independent from sensibility and sub-
ject to laws of  reason rather than inclination. He does not seem to reverse Hume’s 
image by claiming that reason ought to enslave sensibility. Reason should be the 
‘master’, but this master is described as an enlightened ‘autocrat’ who rules in accord-
d D. Hume, A Treatise of  Human Nature, ed. by D. F. Norton, M. J. Norton, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2007 [1739-1740], 2.3.3.4. 
2 The term ‘passion’ in translations of  Kant’s wor is reserved for Leidenschaft, which means something lie 
an obsession. The counterpart to Hume’s ‘passions’, in Kant’s wor, are terms lie ‘sensible impulses’, ‘desires’, 
or ‘inclinations’. 
V Both translations are possible here; Kant uses the feminine ‘domina’ (and ‘serva’) because the German word 
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ance with moral principles, rather than as a capricious despot (MS, AA vi 383; cf. V-
Mo/Mron, AA xxvii 1510). 
In short: the vocabulary we nd in Kant’s discussion of  the ‘freedom’ of  the will is 
the republican terminology of  independence versus dependence, being one’s own 
master versus being enslaved, autonomy versus heteronomy, living under one’s own 
laws versus living under the rule of  a despot. A free will is a will that is a law to itself  
rather than being subject to the «despotism of  desires» (KU, AA v 432). And given 
Kant’s conception of  the will as the capacity to act on the basis of  reasoning, a free 
will is a will that is subject to principles of  practical reason itself. 
This also explains why the cases in which Kant exempts human beings from moral 
responsibility are not cases of  external coercion or lac of  alternative possibilities. 
Rather, they are cases in which human beings are not in full possession of  their ra-
tional capacities. Kant’s own examples are very young children and those who suter 
from severe psychiatric illnesses (Anth, AA vii 213-214, V-MP-L1/Pölitz, AA xxviii 182, 
254). Their will is not free but subordinated to something else: impulses and inclina-
tions, or a delusion resistant to rational correction. 
 
4. 2. Further Advantages of  the Republican Reading 
 
Providing a complete discussion of  Kant’s account of  freedom of  the will lies beyond 
the scope of  this article, but two examples may serve as initial illustrations of  how the 
republican reading can help solve (or dissolve) the notorious interpretive problems 
mentioned in section 2. 3 above. 
First, recall Kant’s cryptic statement that a free will is a will under moral laws, 
which gave rise to the so-called Reinhold-Sidgwic objection and the problem of  re-
sponsibility for bad actions. In light of  the analysis above, the statement turns out 
simply to express the core republican conception of  freedom as living under one’s 
own laws rather than under heteronomous dictates. If  moral laws are the will’s own 
laws, as Kant indeed argues, then a will that is subject to (or ‘under’) moral laws is 
 indeed a free will. Moral laws are not alien impositions on the will; rather, the will «is 
a law to itself» (GMS, AA iv 440, 447); it is free in the republican sense of  the term. But 
this does not imply that a free will is always a good will. Being under a law means that 
one ought to obey it, not that one will. 
Thus understood, Kant’s statement does not imply that agents bear no responsibil-
ity for immoral actions. Consider the analogical case of  the political freedom of  
citizens in a republic. Their political freedom consists in their living under their own 
laws. They live under their own laws, though: they are subject to them, meaning that 
they ought to obey them. When they do not obey them, their crimes can be imputed 
to them. Analogously, a free will is a will under moral laws, and an evil will is no less 
free than a good will. There is no reason to thin that evil cannot be imputed, and the 
Reinhold-Sidgwic problem does not emerge. Thus, the republican bacground of  
Kant’s notion of  freedom illuminates not only the fact that Kant expresses freedom 
of  the will in terms of  its ‘independence’ from sensible desire, but also his otherwise 
enigmatic identication of  a will ‘under moral laws’ with a ‘free’ will. 
In substance, this response to the Reinhold-Sidgwic objection is in line with what 
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tially called Kant’s «Incorporation Thesis».d This is the thesis that «an incentive can 
determine the will only insofar as it has been incorporated [by the agent] into a 
maxim».2 Put diterently, it is the thesis that sensible desires do not by themselves 
(necessarily, automatically) determine the will. Allison rightly presents this thesis as a 
feature of  Kant’s general account of  rational agency, but it is important to recognize 
that the sentence on which he draws is actually Kant’s description of  the freedom of  
the will, that is, its independence from sensible desire: «Freedom of  the will has the 
characteristic, entirely peculiar to it, that [the will] cannot be determined by an incen-
tive to an action except insofar as the human being has incorporated [the incentive] into his 
maxim» (RGV, AA vi 23-24). 
Second, the fact that Kant uses a republican notion of  freedom also explains his 
statement that freedom of  the will should not be dened in terms of  the choice of  
whether to act morally or immorally (MS, AA vi 226). Again, compare the analogical 
case of  political freedom. The freedom of  citizens in a republic does not consist in the 
choice of  whether to obey or disobey the laws. Citizens can disobey the laws, of  
course, and many do. But this is not what their political freedom consists in: it consists 
in the fact that they live under their own laws. By analogy, freedom of  the will does 
not consist in the capacity to decide whether or not to obey the laws of  morality. 
Human agents have this capacity, of  course, and many do disobey. But the freedom 
of  their will consists in its independence from sensibility and its living ‘under’ laws of  
reason (MS, AA vi 226-227). 
These two examples indicate that a ‘republican’ reading of  Kant’s notion of  free-
dom of  the will can be hermeneutically fruitful. Both statements, which have long 
puzzled Kant’s readers, now mae straightforward sense. 
 
4. 3. A Brief  Note on the Word ‘Will’  
I should add a brief  explanation of  why I use ‘will’ throughout this essay rather than 
using diterent translations for Kant’s terms Wille and Willkür. The reason is that Kant 
goes bac and forth in using these terms and does not clearly distinguish them until 
the Metaphysics of  Morals. 
In the Critique of  Pure Reason, Kant uses both Wille and Willkür; moreover, he some-
times uses Vernunft where he later uses Wille in the Groundwork. In the Groundwork, 
he uses almost exclusively the notion of  Wille (dozens of  times), using Willkür only 
twice (GMS, AA iv 428, 451), and not, it seems, to mar a distinction in meaning. In 
the Critique of  Practical Reason, Kant uses both Wille and Willkür without consistent 
diterence in meaning. For example, he goes bac and forth several times between 
«determining ground der Willkür» and «determining ground des Willens» at v 22-24. In 
the Religion, he uses Willkür to refer to the human will and Wille to refer to the will of  
God. Exceptions here are the expressions ‘good will’, ‘evil will’, and ‘general will’ (in 
the political sense), for which he uses Wille. 
In the Metaphysics of  Morals, Kant explicitly distinguishes between Wille and Willkür. 
He writes that Wille is the legislative faculty or practical reason itself, insofar as it can 
serve as the determining ground of  Willkür; Willkür is the elective will or the faculty 
of  choice, including the choice of  maxims (MS, AA vi 213, 226). 
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This distinction between Wille and Willkür does not match Kant’s usage in the ear-
lier texts, as the overview above maes clear. To add one salient example: the Ground-
work’s doctrine of  freedom as the ‘autonomy’ of  the will, which he there phrased in 
terms of  the Wille’s being «a law to itself» (GMS, AA iv 440), cannot be articulated in 
the terminology of  the Metaphysics of  Morals. Indeed, he there speas of  the Wille’s 
being a law to the Willkür (MS, AA vi 213), stops speaing of  the «autonomy» of  the 
will, and claims that the Wille «can be called neither free nor unfree» (MS, AA vi 226). 
Because I focus mostly on Kant’s publications of  the 1780s, given the interest in 
Kant’s reconciliation of  freedom and natural determinism, I use ‘will’ throughout. 
This avoids unnecessary confusion and preserves the ambiguities of  Kant’s own ter-
minology during this decade. 
 
5. Natural Determinism 
and Republican Freedom of the Agent 
 
Imputing an action to me presupposes not only that my will is free in the sense ex-
plained above but also that I can act freely. It requires my ‘absolute’ or ‘transcendental’ 
freedom, for if  my phenomenal actions were merely the result of  natural causal de-
terministic processes, then they would not be under my control. In that case, I would 
be no more morally responsible for my actions than the turnspit is morally respon-
sible for turning (see 2. 2).d This raises the question of  whether and how my absolute 
freedom is compatible with the natural causal determinism of  the phenomenal world 
in which my actions appear. As explained above in section 2. 3, Kant’s answer is gen-
erally viewed as inconsistent. 
In developing his account of  the absolute or transcendental freedom of  the agent, 
Kant again uses the republican notion of  freedom as independence. He describes ab-
solute freedom negatively as the power to «produce something independently of  
those natural causes» (KrV, A 534 B 562). He describes it positively as «absolute self-
activity» (KrV, A 418 B 446), as the «power (Vermögen) to begin a state (Zustand) of  
oneself  (von selbst)» (KrV, A 533 B 561), or as a «spontaneity that can start to act of  
itself, without needing to be preceded by another cause that in turn determines it 
to action according to the law of  causal connection» (KrV, A 533 B 561). These and 
similar descriptions elsewhere are couched in terms of  the familiar republican 
contrast between independence and dependence, between the power to act by one-
self  and subjection to the power of  another, although here the ‘other’ is not another 
human being but natural causality. But it is not immediately clear what this free ac-
tivity amounts to. 
Conceptually speaing, the republican notion of  freedom as independence maes 
absolute freedom compatible with natural determinism: saying that one thing is in-
dependent of  another does not entail denying the other. It says nothing about how 
they can go together, however, and this is the harder question. It might seem that 
d Pereboom argues that Kant is mistaen about this because even if  one is causally determined to do bad 
things, and even if  it is therefore «false that one ought not to do so», one’s actions are «still morally wrong» (D. 
Pereboom, Kant on Transcendental Freedom, «Philosophy and Phenomenological Research», lxxiii, 3, 2006, pp. 
537-567 (562). Pereboom leaves unclear, however, in what (Kantian) sense one’s actions can be morally wrong 
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human beings simply cannot act independently from phenomenal natural determin-
ism if  their future actions can be calculated. 
The republican bacground of  Kant’s notion of  absolute freedom maes it easier, 
however, to recognize the internal structure of  his transcendental idealist version of  
compatibilism. As long as one conceives of  absolute freedom as the power to inter-
vene in phenomenal causal chains or choose between alternative phenomenal op-
tions, the idea of  freedom does indeed have problematic implications. But Kant does 
not describe absolute freedom in that way. Instead, he describes it as the noumenal 
agent’s power to adopt his maxims independently of  natural determinism, and he de-
scribes these maxims as grounding the entire series of  an agent’s phenomenal actions. 
This suggests a solution to the remaining problems mentioned in section 2. 3, or so I 
will argue. 
I presuppose the bacground provided above, especially concerning the guiding 
thought of  transcendental idealism and concerning Kant’s claim that morality gives 
us reason for believing (without nowing) that we have absolute freedom. I rst focus 
on Kant’s description of  the relation between phenomenal actions, empirical regular-
ities, and noumenal character in the context of  moral responsibility attributions. This 
serves to clarify what Kant means by absolute freedom (5. 1). I then argue that this 
analysis sheds new light on his reconciliation of  absolute freedom and natural deter-
minism (5. 2). 
 
5. 1. Phenomenal Actions, Empirical Character, and Noumenal Ground 
 
In discussing the Third Antinomy in the Critique of  Pure Reason, Kant presents a three-
fold analysis of  human agency. He distinguishes between an agent’s (1) phenomenal ac-
tions, (2) empirical character, and (3) noumenal character. 
Kant writes that a human being’s phenomenal actions mae it possible to discern 
his «empirical character». This term refers to the regularity in his behavior. Kant also 
calls empirical character the «law of  [his] causality» and states that it can be «cognized 
(erkannt) on the basis of  experience», that is, on the basis of  patterns in the person’s 
phenomenal actions (KrV, A 540 B 568).d Knowledge of  the agent’s empirical char-
acter, in combination with other empirical laws and conditions, maes it possible to 
explain his past behavior and to predict – in principle, though not necessarily in prac-
tice2 – his future behavior (KrV, A 539 B 567, A 549-550 B 577-578, KpV, AA v 99). 
The agent’s assumed noumenal character cannot be cognized (by denition), nor 
can it play any role in the natural causal explanation of  actions (KrV, A 546 B 574). But, 
Kant suggests, when we impute an action to an agent and evaluate it morally, we con-
ceive of  the agent as acting on the basis of  certain «subjective principles of  his will» 
(KrV, A 549 B 577), and we evaluate these assumed underlying principles. In the Ground-
work and elsewhere, Kant calls these principles «maxims» (cf. GMS, AA iv 400n., 421n.). 
d Allison claims that Kant understands empirical character as an agent’s set of  beliefs, desires, and intentions, 
including «reasons» as «empirical causes» (Allison, Kant’s Theory of  Freedom, pp. 5, 31-33, 49), but this claim does 
not seem to be supported by the texts. 
2 That complete and accurate prediction is impossible in practice is obvious, and not only because of  our 
complex physiology and psychology. Human behavior is in_uenced by hard-to-predict factors such as the 
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He there claries that they are ‘subjective’ in the sense that they are the principles «in 
accordance with which the subject acts», as distinct from the ‘objective’ principles that 
state how he ought to act (421n.). The agent’s maxims constitute his noumenal char-
acter, or, as Kant also calls it, his «moral character» (Anth, AA vii 285). Character in this 
moral sense «refers to that property of  the will, by which the subject binds himself  to 
determinate practical principles that it has prescribed to itself  unalterably through its 
own reason» (Anth, AA vii 292). Moral character can be good or evil, depending on the 
moral quality of  one’s maxims. For example, the ruthless Roman tyrant Sulla had 
(evil) character in this moral sense (Anth, AA vii 293). 
Since we do not have cognitive access to other people’s maxims (or to our own, for 
that matter), we are always fallible in attributing a particular moral character to an 
agent (KrV, A 551n. B 579n.), and we typically need more than one data point. A single 
instance of  honesty may leave open whether the agent is acting on the maxim of  hon-
esty, or on the maxim of  egoism (say, out of  fear of  being caught lying). Thus, we gen-
erally attribute specic action principles to agents on the basis of  patterns we observe 
in their actions, that is, on the basis of  their empirical character (KrV, A 540 B 568; A 
549 B 577; RGV, AA vi 20; see also section 2). 
Rather than targeting the agent’s phenomenal behavior as such, therefore, moral 
imputation and evaluation target the agent qua noumenal ground of  this behavior 
who is responsible for his assumed underlying maxims. For example, we would not 
blame a person if  we believed that his behavior resulted, say, from involuntary spasms. 
When we blame someone, we do so on the assumption that the action was inten-
tional and performed on a morally impermissible maxim. 
Moreover, Kant argues that when we impute phenomenal actions to an agent, we 
assume that he is responsible for adopting the maxims that underlie those actions. We 
assume that in adopting his action principles, he gave himself  the particular moral 
character that underlies the corresponding patterns in his empirical behavior. This as-
sumption presupposes that he was free in adopting these maxims. We assume, in 
Kant’s terminology quoted above, that he adopted them by himself, of  his own ac-
cord, independently of  natural determinism, qua noumenon.d 
Kant articulates a similar account in the Critique of  Practical Reason. When we blame 
others for their phenomenal actions, he writes, we presuppose that they have freely 
adopted the reprehensible action principles that we attribute to them on the basis of  
empirical patterns of  conduct. This is how he describes what is presupposed when we 
hold someone responsible (verantwortlich, KpV, AA v 100) for a string of  bad actions: 
 
This [viz., the blame] could not happen if  we did not presuppose that everything that arises 
from his will (as every action intentionally performed undoubtedly does) has as its ground a 
free causality, which … expresses its character in its appearances (the actions); these actions, 
on account of  the uniformity of  conduct, mae nowable a natural interconnection that does 
not, however, mae the vicious constitution of  the will necessary but is instead the con-
sequence of  the evil and unchangeable principles voluntarily adopted, which mae him only 
more reprehensible and deserving of  punishment. 
(KpV, AA v 100) 
d For a discussion of  Kant’s conception of  the ‘action’ of  substances, including the action of  noumenal 
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In this passage, Kant again distinguishes between (1) appearing actions, (2) the char-
acteristic empirical patterns they display («uniformity of  conduct»), and (3) the «free 
causality» that is thought to underlie these patterns as their (noumenal) «ground»: the 
agent’s will, characterized in terms of  his voluntarily adopted evil maxims. The agent 
is considered to be responsible for his bad actions by virtue of  his having freely 
adopted the maxims that underlie them. Thus, the agent is held responsible not for 
his individual phenomenal actions qua phenomena, but for having voluntarily 
adopted the action principles that underlie them as their ground. 
In the quoted passage, Kant speas of  the agent’s ‘free causality’ even though his 
maxims are evil. This underscores that he does not conceive of  absolute freedom as 
an asymmetrical capacity for adopting morally good maxims only. Moral imputation 
presupposes the agent’s absolute freedom even when he is assumed to have made bad 
use of  it. 
It is also important to note what Kant does not say. Nowhere does he describe 
noumenal freedom as the freedom to alter existing natural causal chains. And nowhere 
does he posit the existence of  alternative phenomenal possibilities at a particular point 
in time. Rather, he describes the presupposed «free causality» of  the agent by reference 
to his voluntary adoption of  the maxims that constitute his moral character. He con-
ceives of  these maxims as grounding the entire phenomenal chain of  the agent’s actions, 
indeed «everything that arises from his will». This is crucial for understanding Kant’s 
reconciliation of  absolute freedom and natural determinism, to which I now turn. 
 
5. 2. Reconciling Natural Determinism and Absolute Freedom 
 
We are now in a position to see the structure of  Kant’s reconciliation of  the absolute 
freedom of  the noumenal agent with the natural determinism of  his phenomenal ac-
tions. The republican notion of  freedom as independence enables Kant to locate the 
absolute freedom of  the agent entirely on the noumenal side, in a way that a ‘contra-
causal’ understanding of  freedom cannot. Recall that according to transcendental ide-
alism, all phenomena, including appearing human actions, are subject to natural de-
terminism, due to the mode of  operation of  our cognitive powers. Recall further that 
all phenomena – whether ships sailing down the river, beavers building dams, or hu-
mans telling lies – are thought to have ‘things in themselves’ as their unnowable 
ground. Only in the case of  some phenomena, namely human actions, do we have any 
reason to mae further assumptions about the unnowable «things in themselves» that 
ground them. This reason is our consciousness of  moral obligation and our practice 
of  moral imputation and evaluation (as explained above, 2. 2 and 5. 1), since they 
prompt us to conceive of  ourselves and others as having the power to adopt maxims 
independently of  natural determinism. Phenomenal actions are part of  the realm of  
natural determinism, and as such they are never free.d But insofar as these actions can 
be regarded as stemming from the noumenal agent’s adopted action principles, tran-
scendental idealism maes it possible to impute his phenomenal actions to him. 
d Appearing actions can be called ‘free’ at most in an indirect sense, namely insofar as they are regarded, in 
moral contexts, as resulting from the agent’s use of  his freedom (KrV, A 551-557 B 579-585; V-Mo/Mron, AA xxvii 
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This sheds new light on Kant’s suggestion in the rst Critique that the liar could have 
and ought to have acted diterently. Had the liar adopted the maxim of  honesty, he 
would have been an honest man. He would have displayed a pattern of  honest ac-
tions, also in the case at hand. He ought to have adopted that maxim. But this means 
just that: he ought to have adopted that maxim. It does not mean that he could have or 
ought to have meddled with existing natural causal chains. His free activity consists 
entirely in his adopting his maxims. Had he adopted the maxim of  honesty, his em-
pirical conduct as a whole would thereby have been diterent, given that his maxims 
underlie his phenomenal actions as their ground. Hence «another intelligible char-
acter would have given another empirical one» (KrV, A 556 B 584). 
This analysis also suggests that the relevant question is not how the liar could ever 
have been honest, considering that the deterministic universe was all lined up to cause 
his lie. Or, more generally, the question is not how noumenal agents can ever choose 
their character if  natural determinism has already charted their life course for them. 
On Kant’s conception as reconstructed here, these questions are ill conceived. 
Noumena are the («thought») things as they are in themselves, that is, in abstraction 
from the specic mode in which we cognize them as appearances. The phenomenal 
series is thought to depend on this noumenal ground. Thus, if  the underlying thing in 
itself  had constituted itself  entirely diterently, then, had we cognized this diterent 
thing, it would have appeared to us diterently. Given the grounding relation between 
noumena and phenomena, if  the liar had been an honest man (if  he had made the 
maxim of  honesty part of  his moral character), then the patterns in his phenomenal 
conduct would have been diterent, and the universe would not have been lined up to 
produce the lie.d Had he adopted a diterent maxim, «the whole sequence of  his exist-
ence as a sensible being» would have been diterent (KpV, AA v 98).2 As a result, the 
diZculties mentioned in 2. 3 – concerning the possibility of  avoiding future moral fail-
ure and the possibility of  producing the proper causal histories of  alternative phe-
nomenal options – do not emerge. 
Why did the liar adopt his bad maxim? How does Kant account for moral failure? It 
might seem that this question poses a new diZculty for Kant. His answer is clear, 
however: evil cannot be explained. Natural causal explanations can be given only 
within the realm of  possible experience and in terms of  natural causal laws (GMS, AA 
iv 459). The agent’s adoption of  his noumenal character lies outside this realm and 
hence beyond the reach of  explanation.V 
d For a reply, along similar lines, to the related worry that an agent’s giving himself  one noumenal character 
rather than another implies his ability to determine the phenomenal past at will, see T. Rosefeldt, Kants Kom-
patibilismus, in Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus, 
ed. by M. Brandhorst, A. Hahmann, B. Ludwig, Hamburg, Meiner, 2012, pp. 77-109. 
2 The following passage oters another instructive statement of  Kant’s view: «In this regard, a rational being 
can rightly say of  every unlawful action he performs that he could have omitted it, even though, as appearance, 
it is suZciently determined in the past and, in that respect, is unavoidably necessary; for this action, with all the 
past that determines it, belongs to a single phenomenon of  his character, which he gives to himself, and in accordance 
with which he imputes to himself, as a cause independent of  all sensibility, the causality of  those appearances» 
(KpV, AA v 98, emphasis added). 
V Kant addresses many other follow-up questions that lie beyond the scope of  the present essay, for example 
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Kant views this not as a weaness but as a great strength of  his theory. If  we could 
explain an agent’s noumenal character, we would be tracing it bac to other causes, 
thereby rendering imputation to the agent himself impossible. In the Religion, Kant 
does not tire of  repeating that the impossibility of  explaining a person’s noumenal 
character is a crucial feature of  his account, since it preserves the possibility of  moral 
imputation (RGV, AA vi 21, 25, 38, 260n.) – and this, after all, is what motivated his de-




The fact that Kant uses the republican notion of  freedom as independence sheds new 
light on his theory of  freedom and suggests novel responses to age-old objections. It 
reveals what Kant means by «freedom of  the will» and «absolute freedom» of  the 
agent, and it illuminates the relation between the (phenomenal) ‘me’ and the (noume-
nal) ‘I’. The term ‘transcendental compatibilism’ would be a tting name for his the-
ory. It would indicate both its rootedness in Kant’s transcendental idealism and its dis-
tance from the standard versions of  compatibilism. 
I have focused on the meaning of  ‘freedom’ in the context of  Kant’s account of  free-
dom of  the will and freedom of  the agent. I have not provided a full discussion and 
analysis of  his account, let alone a defense of  it. It may well turn out that his theory 
faces a new set of  diZculties when read along the lines I have suggested. Whether it 
does is a question well worth exploring.d 
d This essay is an expanded version of  the 2019 Franfurter Kant-Vorlesung, sponsored by the Institute of  
Philosophy of  the Goethe University Franfurt and the Società Italiana di Studi Kantiani. I than Gabriele 
Gava, Stefano Bacin, and Marcus Willasche for the honor of  the invitation and the organization of  the lecture. 
I am also grateful to them, as well as to Daphne Brandenburg, Michael Gregory, Patricia Kitcher, Sven Nyholm, 
Tobias Rosefeldt, and Janis Schaab for valuable comments. I than the audience of  the Franfurter Kant-Vor-
lesung, as well as audiences and organizers at the Humboldt University in Berlin, the Dutch Research School 
of  Philosophy, the 13th International Kant Congress in Oslo, University College Dublin, and the University of  
Munich, for helpful questions and discussion. 
